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Abstract
Standard asset pricing models have difﬁculty explaining cross-sectional differences
in observed equity risk premia of developed and emerging markets. We argue that
national equity returns are subject to sample selectivity. The lack of credible commit-
ment to keep capital markets open (risk of expropriation) leads to this bias. We use the
world CAPM for systematic risk and develop a model of sample selectivity. We ﬁnd
that after taking account of the sample selectivity bias, our model of systematic risk can
account for the differences in risk premia quite well. We estimate the average expropri-
ation risk to be more than 1/2 of the ex-post risk premium for emerging economies and
close to zero for developed economies. Further, we argue that the measured selectivity
bias in equity premia provide valuable economic information regarding the incentives
for sovereigns not to expropriate international investors. We ﬁnd that the measured
expropriation risk is related to reputations in capital markets (as argued in Eaton and
Gersowitz, 1981) and to the magnitude of trade that an economy conducts (as argued
in Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a, 1989b).
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An important message of economic models of asset prices is that expected rates of
returns only reﬂect systematic risk. In the context of developed and emerging eq-
uity markets this implies that expected rates of returns reﬂect aggregate global risks.
However, standard economic models have considerable difﬁculty in capturing the
cross-sectional differences in risk premia across these markets. We show that addi-
tional risks, unique to sovereign nations, such as the imposition of capital controls
(as recently seen in Malaysia and Argentina) and the consequent expropriation of
international investors are critical to understanding the risk-return relation in na-
tional equity markets. Further, the measurement of these unique risks is tied to
sample selectivity biases, and provide insights regarding why sovereigns may, or
may not, default on their international borrowing (see Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981,
and Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a, 1989b).
The possibility that sovereign nations may impose capital controls and hence
expropriate international investors, makes the equity issued in sovereigns akin to
defaultable debt. Gibson and Sundaresan (2001) and Dufﬁe, Pedersen, and Single-
ton (2002) present models for capturing the dynamics of sovereign bond spreads,
where default issues are important as well. These papers, however, do not focus
on risks in equity markets. Evaluating whether the cross-section of national equity
markets (which are open to international investors) solely reﬂects systematic risks
requires that we take account of the fact that a market may expropriate its interna-
tionalinvestorsinthefuture. Weshowthatthisleadstoanupwardbiasinmeasured
mean returns. Related to this idea, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995) theoretically
show that mean returns may be biased upward due to survival biases. In this paper
we use a different approach (similar to Heckman, 1976, 1979) and present a model
where the sample selectivity bias is related to attributes of a given market. We also
provide a relation between the selectivity bias and the sovereign risk in bond mar-
kets. After accounting for sample selectivity, the measured cross-section of equity
premia should solely reﬂect systematic risks. We ﬁnd that the selectivity effects are
large, and after accounting for these, indeed it seems that national equity markets
essentially reﬂect systematic risks.
In addition to understanding the cross-sectional differences in risk premia across
national markets, our approach allows us to address issues regarding the motiva-
1tions for sovereigns for not expropriating foreign capital (e.g., repaying their debts).
In particular, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argue that sovereign nations fulﬁll their
international obligations to avoid reputational losses to keep their costs of inter-
national borrowing low. This argument suggests that the selectivity bias in the
cross-section of risk premia is related to reputational proxies. In contrast, Bulow
and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b) argue that foreign lenders must be able to impose direct
sanctions (such as trade-sanctions) to induce sovereigns to satisfy their international
obligations. In this case, the selectivity bias should be decreasing in trade activity
measures like imports and exports. English (1996) and Conklin (1998) focus on spe-
ciﬁc historical episodes to evaluate which of the two motivations lead sovereigns
not to expropriate international investors.
There are two important ingredients in our empirical work—a model for sample
selectivity and one for systematic risk. Our analysis captures the idea that the in-
ternational marginal investor can invest in a wide range of developed and currently
accessible emerging economies. Hence, expropriation risk in a given economy will
not be part of systematic risk. We use the world capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
for systematic risk. Our model for selectivity relates to the latent variable approach
of Heckman (1976, 1979). Measured mean returns are determined by both system-
atic risks and the selectivity bias. The selectivity bias measures the extra compensa-
tion that a given market has to pay to international investors during periods when
the market is open (i.e., where there is no expropriation).
An important concern for estimation is that the asset pricing conditions from
the perspective of an international investor are valid only when a given market is
accessible to invest in. Our approach to modeling selectivity takes account of this
issue. We use the different stretches of data for 46 developed and emerging markets
from 1984 to 2000 and estimate the model via the generalized method of moments
of Hansen (1982).
WeﬁndthattheCAPMandthetime-varyingbetaCAPMfailtoexplainthecross-
section of risk premia for developed and emerging economies. The cross-sectional
R-squares for these models are close to zero. In contrast, in conjunction with the
sample selectivity bias, they explain about 60% of the cross-sectional variation in
the risk premia across the 46 developed and emerging markets. Our results imply
that once we take account of the sample selectivity, indeed developed and emerging
2markets reﬂect systematic risk. This is particularly important for emerging markets
for which we ﬁnd that the magnitude of the compensation for expropriation risk
is about 6% per annum. This is more than 1/2 of the average measured ex-post
risk premium for emerging markets. Hence, it seems that a large fraction of the
mean returns in these economies is driven by compensation for expropriation risk.
Further, we ﬁnd close to zero compensation for this risk in developed economies.
We ﬁnd that the selectivity bias is highly related to measures of economic perfor-
mance. Further, we ﬁnd that measures of reputation capture the differences in the
this premium fairly well (as argued in Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981); Economies with
better ﬁnancial market reputation have smaller expropriation premia. Differences
in trade activity (i.e., imports plus exports over GDP) across economies also capture
the cross-sectional differences in the expropriation premia. This is consistent with
the arguments presented in Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b). In all, we see no rea-
son why only reputational or only trade activity should matter—indeed we ﬁnd that
both are important. On the margin though, our evidence suggests that the reputa-
tional measure relative to the trade measure, has greater explanatory power. Note
that relating the expropriation risk to various economic and reputational measures
is akin to Edwards (1984), who explores the issue of across-economies differences in
sovereign bond spreads.
Earlier papers on the subject of equity returns document that the static CAPM
fails to explain the cross section of risk premia in emerging markets (see, for in-
stance, Harvey, 1995). Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995), and Goetzmann and Jo-
rion (1999) present theoretical and simulation-based evidence to argue that emerg-
ing markets risk premia may be biased upward due to selectivity bias. However,
they do not directly evaluate the ability of their models to explain the cross-section
of risk premia for developed and emerging economies. Cherian and Perotti (2001)
present a theoretical model for returns which incorporates expropriation risk. Fur-
ther, Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan (2001) provide an
empirical time-series model of returns in emerging markets to measure market in-
tegration. Their approaches do not imply economic restrictions on the cross-section
of measured risk premia.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an asset pric-
ing framework that incorporates the effects of expropriation risk. Section 3 describes
3data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the estimation methodology.
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the main results and
conclusions.
2. An Asset Pricing Framework with Sample Selectivity
This section presents an asset pricing framework that allows for sample selectiv-
ity. We ﬁrst show how risk premia are determined in the world economy when
there are two regimes. We then describe the latent process that determines the two
regimes and the way sample selectivity arise. We also discuss how sample selec-
tivity affect ex-post measured risk premia. Finally, we consider the link between a
dollar-denominated bond and the probability of expropriation.
2.1. The Systematic Risk Speciﬁcation
All markets that are accessible to international investors satisfy the following asset
pricing condition
E(mt+1Rit+1|It) = 1, (1)
where mt+1 is a stochastic discount factor that describes systematic risk in the world
economy, Rit+1 is the gross dollar return on market i, and It is the information set
of the investors at time t. The condition follows from the assumption of absence of
arbitrage in frictionless asset markets (see, for instance, Hansen and Richard, 1987).
Different asset pricing models restrict mt+1 in different ways. We let the stochastic




(1 − λet+1), (2)
where λ is the aggregate market price of risk, Rft is the gross riskfree rate, and et+1
is the innovation in the stochastic discount factor. We let σ2
et denote the conditional
variance of the innovation in the stochastic discount factor. For example, if et+1 is
the innovation in the world market portfolio return, then equation (2) will coincide
with the version of the stochastic discount factor for the world CAPM. This is an
important special case which will be the focus of our empirical work. This speciﬁca-
4tion of the discount factor captures the intuition that systematic risk compensation
is solely associated with market betas. For further discussion regarding discount
factors, see Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1997).
Our empirical work will focus on the case when systematic risk compensation is
consistent with the world CAPM. It is important to recognize that we are interested
in understanding risk-return relations exclusively from the perspective of an inter-
national investor who holds the world market portfolio. The relevant returns that
we want to explain pertain to periods when (i) markets are open to international in-
vestors, and (ii) investable dollar returns are available to an econometrician. In our
approach markets are integrated but investors fear expropriation. This is similar
to the approach taken in Gibson and Sundaresan (2001) and Dufﬁe, Pedersen, and
Singleton (2002). However, this approach is distinct from Eun and Janakiramanan
(1986) and Errunza and Losq (1985) who derive risk premia implications when in-
vestors face participation constraints.1
2.2. Country Return Dynamics
To derive implications for systematic risk compensation and selectivity biases, we
model individual market returns as a two-regime process. We interpret regime 1
as the regime when the market is open to international investors and investable
dollar-denominated returns are available for a given market. We discuss the details
of this in the data section below. Regime 2 is the regime where investable dollar re-
turns are not available and the market is inaccessible to international investors. We
view the transition from regime 1 to regime 2 as being associated with expropria-
tion of international investors. This expropriation can take various forms, including
capital controls, foreign exchange restrictions, and taxes on repatriations of foreign
investments. Information regarding the payoffs to international investors during
the transition from regime 1 to regime 2 and the ex-ante probability with which this
transition can happen are not observable to an econometrician. In essence, we view
emerging markets returns akin to payoffs of a defaultable bond which has not de-
faulted. As with the defaultable bond, the likelihood of transition from regime 1
to regime 2 affects measured mean returns obtained solely from data sampled from
regime 1. Hence, one would expect that observed mean returns, particularly for an
1See Karolyi and Stulz (2002) for a recent survey of international asset pricing.
5emerging market, to be higher than the ex-ante risk premium. This bias measures
the compensation for expropriation and helps us understand the risk-return relation
across markets.
In equation (3), we present a time-series representation of returns that will allow
us to derive separate systematic risk compensation from sample selectivity biases
in expected returns. Let yit+1 represent an indicator for the regime in market i at
t + 1 being 1 or 2. The indicator yit+1 is equal to one if the regime at t + 1 is 1 (open
to international investors), and zero otherwise. The return process, expressed in
dollars, is speciﬁed as
Rit+1 = E(Rit+1|It) + yit+1 (βi1et+1 + ηi1t+1) + (1 − yit+1)(βi2et+1 + ηi2t+1), (3)
where E(Rit+1|It) is the ex-ante conditional mean of the gross return, et+1 is the
innovation in the systematic risk component, and ηi1t+1 and ηi2t+1 are diversiﬁable
risk components speciﬁc to market i. The exposure of the return to systematic risk
is determined by βi1 and βi2.
Let rit+1 denote the excess return on market i, that is, rit+1 = Rit+1 − Rft. Assum-
ing that yit = 1, the valuation condition (1) then implies that
E(rit+1|It) = λσ2
et [pitβi1 + (1 − pit) βi2], (4)
where pit istheprobabilityoftheregimewheremarket i isaccessibletointernational
investors at time t. In other words, pit is the conditional probability that yit+1 = 1,
and (1 − pit) is the probability of a switch to regime 2. The risk premium is deter-
mined by the aggregate market price of risk, λσ2
et, and an overall beta which is a
probability-weighted average of the betas in the two regimes. Next, we describe the
determination of regimes 1 and 2.
2.3. The Sample Selectivity Process
Let y∗
it be a latent process that determines the opening and closing for market i. That
is, it determines if the regime is 1 or 2. In particular, if y∗
it > 0 then the regime is 1
and if y∗








Following Heckman (1976, 1979), we assume that the conditional mean of the latent




ixit + εit+1, εit+1|xit ∼ N(0,1), (6)
where εit+1, by assumption, is a standard normal error. Brown, Goetzmann, and
Ross (1995) argue that the survival of a market (the analogue of our regime 1) is de-
termined solely by the price process itself. However, this seems restrictive, as many
emerging markets, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, have had compa-
rable drops in the market capitalization, but only Malaysia, directly expropriated
international investors. This suggests that other economic considerations may be
important in determining whether investable dollar-denominated returns are avail-
able to an international investor. These other inﬂuences are captured by xit and
εit+1. Further, the latent variable model of selectivity provides connections between
default risk in sovereign dollar-denominated bonds and the likelihood of capital
controls. This allows us to provide a link between the cross-section of equity risk
premia and country risk ratings.
Let φ(.) denote the standard normal probability density function, and let Φ(.)
denote the standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is straightforward
to show that the conditional probability that yit+1 = 1 is characterized by















where the third equality follows from the symmetry of the normal distribution. As
εit+1 and the innovation in the return of asset i may be correlated, consider the fol-
lowing conditional projections for the different regimes
βi1et+1 + ηi1t+1 = γi1εit+1 + vi1t+1, (8)
βi2et+1 + ηi2t+1 = γi2εit+1 + vi2t+1, (9)
where γi1 and γi1 are the projection coefﬁcients between βijet+1 +ηit+1 and εit+1 and
βijet+1 + ηit+1 and εit+1, respectively, and vi1t+1 and vi2t+1 are projection errors. The
7above equations then imply that the excess return process can be written as
rit+1 = E(rit+1|It) + yit+1(γi1εit+1 + vi1t+1) + (1 − yit+1)(γi2εit+1 + vi2t+1). (10)
2.4. The Sample Selectivity Criteria
We consider the case where data are missing as an outcome of an attrition pro-
cess. That is, we consider the sample selectivity effects of only observing the regime
where the markets are accessible to international investors. In this case, the restric-
tion on the empirical conditional mean of the returns is






where we have conditioned on the fact that the market is in regime 1 today (yit = 1)






is the same as E(εit+1|yit+1 = 1). Moreover, this quantity satisﬁes the relation























This is typically referred to as a hazard rate, or the inverse Mill’s ratio. We denote
this by hit, that is, hit = φ(δ0
ixit)/Φ(δ0
ixit). Based on the above results, it follows that
the conditional mean of the excess return is given by
E(rit+1|It,yit = 1,yit+1 = 1) = λσ2
et [pitβi1 + (1 − pit) βi2] + γi1hit. (14)
This restriction shows that there are two biases in measuring the ex-ante risk pre-
mium. The ﬁrst bias stems from the fact that the econometrician does not observe
regime 2 (the regime when investable dollar returns are not available). This is re-
ﬂected in the ﬁrst term of (14). βi1 can obviously be identiﬁed in the time series from
observations when the market is open. βi2 is the beta at transition from regime 1 to
2. Identiﬁcation of βi2 and the transition probability of going to regime 2 (that is,
81 − pit) can not be measured without additional restrictions. Note that the resulting
bias is on the ex-ante mean of the return and we refer to it as a peso problem.
The second bias is due to sample selectivity, and the effects of this can be seen
in the second term of (14). This is an adjustment to the ex-post mean to correctly
estimate the ex-ante risk premium. Conditional on the availability of dollar returns
today and tomorrow, the risk premium is biased upwards. Put differently, investors
require, on average, a higher return when the market offers dollar returns, much
like a defaultable bond.
Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995) focus on the second effect. It seems that
the measured risk premium will also be affected by the beta associated with the
market shut-down regime. If this beta is higher that in the regime for which data
is available, then the ex-ante mean asset will be higher, and in standard time-series
regression this will show up as an abnormal return, or an alpha. However, purging
the empirical means of these two effects implies that the ex-ante means lie on the
security market line.
In the special case of the world CAPM, equation (14) can be stated as
E(rit+1|It,yit = 1,yit+1 = 1) = E(rMt+1|It)[pitβi1 + (1 − pit) βi2] + γi1hit, (15)
where E(rMt+1|It) is the conditional risk premium on the world market portfolio,
and the betas are the world CAPM betas for the two regimes. As discussed above,
taking account of the peso problem requires measurement of βi2 and pit. In practise,
estimating βi2 from returns during a regime-switch is infeasible as there are very
few, if any, in available return data. Hence, in the empirical work, we will assume
that βi1 = βi2 = βiM. This gives us the following cross-sectional implications
E(rit+1|It,yit = 1,yit+1 = 1) = λMtβiM + γi1hit, (16)
where λMt = E(rMt+1|It). In the empirical work we also consider time-variation in
betas. Allowing for this time-variation is straightforward and does not affect any of
the derivations above.
Finally, note that for high survival probabilities, the hazard rate in equation (13)
is almost linear in the probabilities. Under the assumption that the probabilities
about expropriation in equity markets and sovereign debt markets are highly re-
9lated, it is straightforward to show that pit can essentially be backed out from ob-
served sovereign bond spreads (see Appendix A). The premise that probabilities
of bond default and expropriation in equity markets are related is supported by
the events in Malaysia in 1998 and the more recent events in Argentina. Note that
for small default probabilities, the hazard rate is almost linear in sovereign bond
spreads. As discussed and documented later, at least for the few sovereign spreads
that we observe, the spreads are highly correlated with observed measures of coun-
try ratings. Hence, we can use the more extensively available data on country rat-
ings to measure the hazard rates themselves.
3. Data
We collect monthly return data on 46 developed and emerging markets from Datas-
tream. According to International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank, 21
of these markets are classiﬁed as developed and 25 as emerging markets. The un-
derlying sources of the data are Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) for
developed markets and IFC for emerging markets. The returns from IFC are the
investable returns that incorporate foreign investment restrictions (including special
classes of shares, sector restrictions, single foreign shareholder limits, restrictions
allowing only authorized investors, company statues, and national limits). We also
consider the return on the MSCI world market portfolio. All returns are in U.S. dol-
lars, and excess returns are calculated by subtracting the one-month Eurodollar rate
for each month.
The sample period is January 1984 to November 2000. It is, however, well known
that many emerging markets only were accessible for international investors begin-
ning in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. This is reﬂected in our data base. Data
for emerging markets are included as and when they open up. We let the opening
date of an emerging market be the date when IFC begins to record investable returns.
The inclusion date for each market is shown in Table 1. The inclusion dates are sim-
ilar to what other studies have considered to be the ﬁnancial market liberalization
dates (see, for instance, Kim and Singal, 2000, Bekaert and Harvey, 2000, and Henry,
2000). Our empirical results are not sensitive to using alternative choices of liberal-
ization dates. The total number of observations for developed markets is 203 and
10for emerging markets the number of observations varies between 90 and 144.
In Table 1 we report summary statistics of the monthly dollar returns. The av-
erage returns across developed and emerging markets are about the same, 1.32%
and 1.34% per month, respectively. However, the average standard deviation of
emerging markets is about twice as high as for developed markets. It also seems
to be greater dispersion in returns and return volatilities of emerging economies.
The correlation with the world market return is much higher for developed markets
than for emerging markets.
Table 2 presents information regarding various attributes of the countries. These
attributes are used in our cross-sectional analysis of risk premia. The Real GDP per
Capita attribute is the real GDP per capita in constant dollars in 1990 (expressed in
international prices, base 1985). The Trading Activity attribute is the sum of exports
and imports divided by GDP in 1990. The real GDP per capita and trading activity
attributes are collected from the World Penn Tables. The Economic Rating and the
Financial Rating attributes refer to the average country ratings from inclusion date
toNovember2000, andisprovidedbytheInternationalCountryRiskGuide(ICRG).
The economic risk rating is meant to measure an economy’s current strengths and
weaknesses, whereas the ﬁnancial risk rating is meant to measure an economy’s
ability to ﬁnance its ofﬁcial, commercial, and trade obligations. More speciﬁcally,
the variables determining the economic rating include a weighted average of inﬂa-
tion, debt service as a percent of exports, international liquidity ratios, foreign trade
collection experience, current account balance, and foreign exchange market indica-
tors. In the empirical work our measure of reputation is the ﬁnancial rating, which
is a weighted average of loan default, delayed payment of suppliers’ credit, repudi-
ation of contracts by government, losses from exchange controls, and expropriation
of private investment. The country ratings are published on a scale from 0 to 50
where a higher number indicates lower risks. We have re-scaled the ratings to be
between 0 (low) and 100 (high). A rating of 0 to 49 then indicates a very high risk;
50 to 59 high risk; 60 to 69 moderate risk; 70 to 79 low risk; and 80 or more very
low risk. The country rating are used by Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) in their
study of the time-series predictability of future returns. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) use these ratings to study investor protection and owner-
ship structure across countries. In this paper we use the ratings to measure sample
selectivity.
11Finally, we report betas versus the MSCI world market portfolio. The betas are,
on average, about the same for developed and emerging markets. However, the
dispersion in betas is much larger across emerging markets ranging from 0.07 to
1.80, whereas they are all about one in the developed markets.
It is evident from Table 2 that the emerging economies are economies with rela-
tively low GDP per capita. Further, emerging economies have a much lower country
ratings than developed economies. In fact, the correlation between the real GDP per
capita and the ratings are 70% (economic rating) and 80% (ﬁnancial rating). The
trading activity attribute has a lower correlation with the real GDP per capita (about
20%). The correlations between trading activity and the ratings are about 20% and
40%. There are a few outliers (notably Hong Kong and Singapore), but excluding
them does not affect the correlation between trading activity and credit rating sig-
niﬁcantly.
We also collect sovereign spreads for nine emerging economies from J.P. Mor-
gan.2 These are economies with Brady bonds (restructured dollar-denominated
debt). We argue that the country ratings contain much of the cross-sectional in-
formation in the spreads. For each month, we computed the correlation between
the sovereign spreads and the composite country ratings. The correlations varied
from -95% to -46% with an average of -72%. That is, sovereign nations with a high
spread on their dollar-denominated debt tend to have a low country rating. This is
also highlighted in Figure 1, which shows the spreads versus country ratings after
the averages of the variables for each month have been subtracted. That is, the vari-
ables are measured as deviation from month averages to sweep out time effects. The
correlation is about -58% and is highly signiﬁcant (a p-value close to zero). Similar
results are obtained with either ﬁnancial or economic country ratings.
Our sample begins in 1984 for developed markets, and in the late 1980s and
early 1990s for emerging markets. Consequently, only brief data histories are avail-
able, particularly for emerging economies. This makes it difﬁculty to solely rely on
time-series methods for measurement and statistical inference. For this reason, we
extensively use pooled cross-sectional methods in the estimation. Importantly, the
relative rankings of the attributes do not vary a lot over time, indicating that most
of the information is in the cross-section. We typically rely on the time series to
2The nine economies are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Korea, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Turkey, and
Venezuela.
12estimate exposures to risk sources, but evaluates the asset pricing implications in
the cross-section. Increasing the sample for developed markets (going back to 1976)
does not change our results qualitatively and are therefore not reported.
In some speciﬁcations we allow the beta of a market versus the world market
portfolio to vary according a conditional information variable, namely the world ex-
cess dividend yield (i.e., the dividend yield on the world market portfolio in excess
of the one-month Eurodollar deposit rate). These series are collected from Datas-
tream.
4. Estimation and Methodology
In this section we present the estimation approach and discuss testable implications
in the time series as well as in the cross-section. We employ the generalized method
of moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982) to estimate all parameters simultaneously as
in Cochrane (2001), and similar to Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) and Jagannathan and
Wang (2002). In this framework, speciﬁc distributional assumptions of the asset re-
turns are not required, and we do not need to work in a normally independently
and identically distributed setting. We can handle both conditional heteroskedastic-
ity and serial correlation in pricing errors. The approach is different from traditional
approaches as we avoid the problem of generated regressors, and it is not necessary
to develop further methods and corrections as in two-step procedures.
We have to deal with missing data as the dollar return series for emerging mar-
kets have different lengths of histories. That is, we have an unbalanced panel. We
handle the missing data as in Bansal and Dahlquist (2000). The idea is to balance the
data set, and then apply the asymptotic results in the standard GMM framework.
This is further discussed below.
We are interested in estimating the risk exposures and risk premia simultane-
ously. Consider N markets(i = 1,2,..., N), eachwith T observations(t = 1,2,...,T).
Recall that the emerging markets have different lengths of histories. We describe the
estimation approach for the world CAPM with time-varying betas.
As in Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Cochrane (1996), amongst others, we eval-
uate the implications of the model in the cross-section as their is considerable cross-
13sectional variation in the mean returns. Consider the cross-sectional risk premium
implications in equation (16). In addition, allow for the market beta of an asset to
be time-varying according to βiM + βiMzzt, where zt is a variable known at time t
capturing time variation in the market beta. The implications for the cross-section
of unconditional mean excess returns can then be written as
E(rit+1) = λMβiM + λMzβiMz + γihi, (17)
where λM = E(λMt) and λMz = E(λMtzt). The βiMs and βiMzs are the standard
time series projection coefﬁcients. Hence, our ﬁrst sets of moment conditions, for
each market i, are
E[(rit+1 − αiM − βiMrMt+1 − βiMzrMt+1zt)yityit+1] = 0, (18)
E[(rit+1 − αiM − βiMrMt+1 − βiMzrMt+1zt)rMt+1yityit+1] = 0, (19)
E[(rit+1 − αiM − βiMrMt+1 − βiMzrMt+1zt)rMt+1ztyityit+1] = 0. (20)
These moment conditions are exactly identiﬁed. We have 3N moment conditions
and the same number of parameters. The point estimates from these moment con-
ditions correspond to the usual least squares estimates. We follow the literature and
add constants, or alphas. In the world CAPM, the αiMs should be equal to zero.
Indeed, we will evaluate the CAPM by checking whether the alphas are all equal to
zero in the time series. Our focus, however, is on the ability of the various models
(with and without sample selectivity) to explain the cross-section of risk premia.
Note that we use the regime indicator variable to make our unbalanced panel a
balanced panel as in Bansal and Dahlquist (2000). That is, the moment conditions
are multiplied with the product of the regime indicators at time t and t + 1, yityit+1.
The product yityit+1 selects returns when markets are open both at time t and t + 1.
In essence, this procedure treats missing observations as zeros. This has a practical
advantage since the usual moment conditions which contain missing data can be
ﬁlled with zeros, and then standard GMM routines can be utilized.3
The sample selectivity part in equation (17) is γihi. As noted in the discussion
of equation (14), under simplifying assumptions, the probability of default can be
recovered from the sovereign bond spread. Further, this spread can be used to
3Hayashi (2000) considers, also in an analysis of panel data, a similar approach. Stambaugh (1997)
presents an alternative approach to address this econometric issue.
14completely characterize the hazard rate at time t. However, the data on sovereign
interest rate spreads are not available for many economies in our sample period.
As shown earlier, there is a high negative correlation between the country ratings
and the spreads in the cross-section (for economies where sovereign spread data are
available). That is, a country with a low rating tends to have a high spread (a high
probability of default). Consequently, to characterize the cross-section of hazard
rates, we model the hazard rate for market i as follows
γihi = (γ00 + γ01Ci) Ai, (21)
where Ai proxies for hi in the cross-section. For example, we let Ai equal the country
is economic rating which then captures the cross-sectional variation in the hazard
rate. Further, to allow for controlled cross-sectional heterogeneity in γi, we model it
as γi = γ00 + γ01Ci, where Ci denotes a country-speciﬁc attribute such as its return
volatility, ﬁnancial rating, or its trading activity.
The cross-sectional parameters (i.e., the risk premium parameters and the γ00
and γ01 parameters) are then identiﬁed in the last set of moment conditions for each
asset i
E[(rit+1 − λMβiM − λMzβiMz − γ00Ai − γ01AiCi)yityit+1] = 0. (22)
We also consider a speciﬁcation with a constant term
E[(rit+1 − λ0 − λMβiM − λMzβiMz − γ00Ai − γ01AiCi)yityit+1] = 0. (23)
The constant term λ0 should be zero according to theory, and a non-zero constant
indicates that a model cannot price the assets on average. Alternatively, a non-zero
constant can be interpreted as a zero-beta rate different from the riskfree rate that
is imposed. Note that all parameters including the betas and the cross-sectional
parameters λ0, λM, λMz, γ00, and γ01 are jointly estimated using GMM. Details of
the estimation are given in Appendix B.
155. Results
This section presents the empirical results. Recall, that we earlier reported that the
cross-sectional dispersion in the average returns is fairly large for emerging mar-
kets and small for developed markets. This cross-sectional dispersion poses a se-
rious challenge to asset pricing models. Variables that characterize the selectivity
bias, such as country ratings, have very little time-series variation, but considerable
cross-sectional variation. Hence, the effects of selectivity are primarily identiﬁable
in the cross-section. Given the large cross-sectional dispersion in the data along with
the short data histories for many emerging markets, we, as in Black, Jensen, and Sc-
holes (1972), Fama and MacBeth (1973), and Jagannathan and Wang (1996), focus
primarily on the explaining the cross-sectional differences in risk-premia.4
We ﬁrst discuss the ability of the various models to capture the cross-section of
average returns through only systematic risk. We then include sample selectivity in
the cross-section. Finally, we discuss the results and provide further interpretations
of the results.
5.1. Evidence in the Absence of Selectivity
In Table 3, we provide evidence from the cross-section of asset returns. The esti-
mated risk premium for the market portfolio is negative, as can be seen in row 2 of
Panel A. This is a standard ﬁnding (see, for instance, Jagannathan and Wang, 1996).
The ability of the CAPM with constant betas to explain the cross-section of average
returns is basically zero as indicated by the adjusted R-square. In Panel B, we con-
sider the CAPM where the market betas are allowed to be time-varying. The model
fails to capture the cross-sectional dispersion in average returns in this speciﬁcation
as well. The adjusted R-square is only about 8%. The theoretical restriction that
λ0 = 0 can be rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level. However, the constant term, as
discussed below, is not particularly relevant when sample selectivity is included in
the model.
4For completeness, we have conducted the time-series tests for both the constant beta and time-
varying beta versions of the CAPM (not reported in a table). We ﬁnd that the joint test of zero alphas
is rejected in both cases. The rejections seem to be primarily due to abnormal returns in emerging
markets—this is consistent with Harvey (1995) who also shows that CAPM implications are rejected
in emerging markets data.
16The failure of the CAPM can also be seen in Figure 2 where we plot the average
returns against the predicted expected returns from the model. A true model would,
ignoring estimation errors, produce observations along the 45-degree line. The ﬁg-
ure reveals that there is almost no dispersion in predicted expected returns. Hence,
the model does not capture the large cross-sectional variation in average returns.
5.2. Evidence with Selectivity Included
The model speciﬁcations with sample selectivity are also reported in Table 3. In
these speciﬁcations the selectivity is modelled as (γ00 + γ01σi)Ai, where σi is the
annual return volatility for market i, and Ai is deﬁned as the economic rating for
country i less the economic rating for the U.S. The expression (γ00 + γ01σi) is the
γi for country i. The proxy for the hazard rate for country i is Ai, based on the
reasoning provided earlier. Note that Ai is negative for emerging economies and
close to zero for developed economies. This speciﬁcation captures the intuition that
aseconomiesimprovetheireconomicratingtheybecomeakintodevelopedmarkets
and the sample selectivity term would fall.
When sample selectivity is incorporated in the standard CAPM (in Panel A), the
cross-sectional R-square rises to 41% and the parameters associated with the selec-
tivity term are signiﬁcant (a p-value of 3%). The time-varying beta based CAPM
with sample selectivity included is reported in Panel B. This speciﬁcation does quite
well in capturing the cross-sectional variation in risk premia, and has an adjusted
R-square of 61%. The magnitudes of the parameters that govern the selectivity bias
(that is, γ00 and γ01) are similar across different speciﬁcations. They are in all cases
jointly signiﬁcant at usual signiﬁcance levels (see the column labelled “Test of Joint
Signiﬁcance”). The last two rows of Panel B highlights the relevance, or the lack
thereof, of the constant term λ0. The empirical results across the two cases (includ-
ing λ0, or not) are comparable. Hence, as suggested by theory, the constant term is
not particularly important.
Table 4 provides the magnitudes of the overall risk premia explained by system-
atic risk and by sample selectivity. Economies with poor economic rating have a
larger and positive selectivity bias. For developed economies the variable Ai is es-
sentially zero and hence the effect of selectivity on their mean returns is absent. For
the constant beta CAPM, the systematic risk contribution is about 0.45% per month
17for both emerging and developed economies. However, the selectivity premium is
0.50% per month for emerging markets and close to zero for developed markets. In
the model with time-varying betas (see Panel B), the fraction of the emerging market
return attributed to the selectivity bias is somewhat higher, and now stands at 0.58%
per month. For emerging markets more than 1/2 of the ex-post risk premium can be
attributed to selectivity. That is, sample selectivity seems to be the dominant inﬂu-
ence on the measured risk premiums in emerging economies. Sample selectivity is
not an important dimension for understanding measured risk premia in developed
markets.
The higher explanatory ability of the world CAPM with time-varying betas and
sample selectivity can be seen in Figure 3 which displays the average returns against
predicted expected returns. The improvement in ﬁt is visible and the model is able
to produce the high dispersion in average returns.
We also considered alternative speciﬁcations for the parameter γi. In particular,
wereplaced σi withareputationalvariable—theﬁnancialratingofaneconomy i less
the comparable rating for the U.S. The ability of this speciﬁcation in terms of cap-
turing the cross-sectional variation in risk premia (i.e., adjusted R-square) is about
30%. This R-square is quite high relative the speciﬁcations without the selectivity
effects. As shown in Table 4 the average emerging markets risk premium is still pre-
dominantly due to selectivity bias. Yet another choice for the speciﬁcation of γi, the
trading activity variable, produces again similar results.
Finally, we consider a speciﬁcation where we use the spreads (short samples
available for nine economies) on the Brady bonds to measure the hazard rates di-
rectly. The approach is as follows. We project the average spreads on the aver-
age country ratings and use these projection coefﬁcients to infer spreads and de-
fault probabilities (under the assumption of zero recovery as in Appendix A) for all
emerging markets. Recall that we are making the assumption that the probability
of default in debt markets coincides with the probability of expropriation. From
the probabilities we can then compute the hazard rates (i.e., the his). For developed
markets we assume a zero default probability (and hence a zero hazard rate). With
this measure of the hazard rate, and the same speciﬁcation for the γi as before, we
estimate the cross-sectional regression in equation (22). This speciﬁcation captures
about 36% of the cross-sectional variation in risk premia. We ﬁnd that the selectivity
18term, that is γihi, is about the 0.63% per month. The average probability of the de-
fault is about half a percent per month. Hence, the bias in the mean return of about
0.63% per month can be supported by rather small probability of default (risk of ex-
propriation). Note that the empirical evidence for this speciﬁcation is quite similar
to that discussed in the time-varying beta case in Panel B of Table 3.
5.3. What Drives the Selectivity Bias?
In Panel A of Table 5 we inquire what economic variables can explain the cross-
sectional dispersion in the selectivity bias for emerging markets. In particular, we
are interested in whether the measured selectivity premium is related to trading ac-
tivity and/or measures of reputation. To do so, we consider the measures of the
selectivity premium based on the speciﬁcation where γi = (γ00 + γ01σi), and the
relative economic rating is the proxy for the hazard rate. This speciﬁcation was re-
ported in Table 3. The reputational variable (the ﬁnancial rating of country i less
the comparable rating for the U.S.) is able to explain about 32% of the dispersion in
the selectivity premium. This regression also shows that the selectivity premium
rises as the country’s ﬁnancial rating falls. Similarly, when we use the trading
activity variable, this explains about 19% of the dispersion in the selectivity pre-
mium. Economies with larger trading activity have a smaller selectivity premium.
In essence our evidence suggests that both trading activity and reputational consid-
erations are important for explaining the selectivity premium.
Allowing the selectivity premium to depend on the volatility in the cross-section
is motivated by arguments presented in Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995). Our
evidence indicates that this attribute is not uniquely important to capture the cross-
sectional differences in risk premia. Indeed, the trade activity and ﬁnancial repu-
tation variables do, at least in economic terms, a comparable job of explaining the
cross-sectional differences in the risk premia. Thus, it seems to us that this is due
to the fact that the volatility of returns are related to these variables. This is shown
in Panel B of Table 5: return volatility is decreasing in both trading activity and
ﬁnancial reputation. These variables, based on the work of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981), and Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b) should matter to the compensation
that emerging markets have to additionally pay, due to risks of expropriation. We
ﬁnd that this indeed is the case.
196. Conclusion
Inthispaperweshowthatthecross-sectionaldifferencesintheequityreturnsacross
sovereign economies is determined by two features—systematic risk and a selectiv-
ity premium. We show that the selectivity premium captures more than 1/2 of the
average risk premium in emerging markets. The equity risk premia in developed
markets seems to be driven solely by systematic risk. The main economic implica-
tion of this result is that after taking account of selectivity premium all international
equity returns reﬂect systematic risk, as predicted by theory.
Our empirical work also shows that sovereigns that have better ﬁnancial market
reputations and trade more actively have to pay a smaller selectivity premium. This
empirical evidence lends support to the view that both reputations and fear of trade
sanctions are important in determining the cost of equity borrowing for a sovereign
nation.
20A. Measuring Hazard Rates From Sovereign Spreads
This Appendix shows how the hazard rate can be measured from sovereign bond
spreads. Consider a dollar denominated pure discount bond issued by a country.
The payoff is equal to one if there is no default, and µb + βbet+1 +ηbt+1 if the country
defaults. The payoff process can thus be written as
qbt+1 = ybt+1 + (1 − ybt+1)(µb + βbet+1 + ηbt+1). (24)
For simplicity, we assume that βb = 0. That is, we assume that the recovery value
of the bond is not related to the systematic risk in the world economy. Further, the
expected payoff on this bond in default is less than one (i.e., µb < 1). Valuing this
payoff using the stochastic discount factor implies that
1/Rbt = [pbt + (1 − pbt)µb]/Rft. (25)
Solving for the probability of no default, we obtain
pbt =
Rft − µbRbt
Rbt (1 − µb)
. (26)
Assume that the probabilities of default for the bond correspond to the probability
of a market shut-down, that is, pbt = pit. Under the further assumption that the
recovery rate is zero, we can directly recover the probability of default. Further,
given the normal cumulative distribution function we can completely characterize
the hazard rate.
The above expression can also be used to compute the ex-ante beta on market i.
We denote this with βit = pitβi1 + (1 − pit) βi2. If we assume that the ratio of the











Note that Rft and Rbt can be observed directly from U.S. Treasuries and Sovereign
bonds, or aswe demonstrate, approximated with acountry’s relative country rating.
Hence, conditional on c, one can estimate the model with both a peso problem and
sample selectivity. In the special case with c = 1, there is no peso problem and we
have that βit = βi1 = βi2.
21B. Estimation Details
This Appendix shows the estimation in more detail. Let θ0 denote the true param-
eter vector that we want to estimate. The typical elements in θ0 are αiM, βiM, and
βiMz that are speciﬁc to each market, and the common parameters λ0, λM, λMz, γ00
and γ01. By stacking the sample counterparts of the moment conditions in (18) to








where Xt summarizes the data used to form the moments conditions. The vector
gT (θ) has the dimension 4N. The moment conditions, given by (18) to (20), exactly
identify the αiM, βiM, and βiMz parameters. However, the moment conditions, given
by (23), is overidentiﬁed. We have N moment conditions, but only 5 parameters (λ0,
λM, λMz, γ00 and γ01).
We estimate the parameters by setting linear combinations of gT equal to zero.
That is, the moment conditions can be written as
ATgT = 0, (29)
where AT is a (3N + 5) × 4N matrix. In particular, our choice of AT is designed to
ensure that the point estimates are the ones given by ordinary least squares. Let AT
be the product of two matrices denoted by A1T and A2T (that is, AT = A1TA2T). The
following matrices result in least square point estimates
A1T =

      
 

I3N 03N ··· 03N
00
3N 1 ··· 1
00
3N ˆ β1M ··· ˆ βNM
00
3N ˆ β1Mz ··· ˆ βNMz
00
3N A1 ··· AN
00
3N C1A1 ··· CNAN





where I3N is the identity matrix with dimension 3N, 03N is a 3N vector of zeros,
0N is an N vector of zeros, and A2T is a diagonal matrix with typical element equal
to 1/∑
T
t=1 yit+1. The ˆ βiMs and ˆ βiMzs are estimates of βiMs and βiMzs, and they are
given in the estimation. The ˆ βiMs and ˆ βiMzs are exactly the least square estimates
22obtained in a regression of the assets’ excess returns on the market excess return
and scaled market excess returns as in (18) to (20). Further, the estimates of λ0, λM,
λMz, γ00, and γ01 coincide with the least square estimates obtained in a regression
of average returns on the betas and the proxies for sample selectivity. Our choice of
AT ensures that ATgT (θT) = 0.
Based on Hansen (1982) we know that when linear combinations of gT are set
equal to zero as in (29), the asymptotic distribution of the point estimator θT is given
by
√












where D0 is the gradient of the moment conditions in (28), and where S0 is the












The sample counterpart ST is estimated using the procedure in Newey and West
(1987) with four lags. D0 and A0 can be estimated by their sample counterparts DT
and AT. Note that the standard errors based on (31) are robust to heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation in the moment conditions.
23References
Bansal, Ravi, and Magnus Dahlquist, 2000, The Forward Premium Puzzle: Different
Tales from Developed and Emerging Markets, Journal of International Economics
51, 115–144.
Bekaert, Geert, and Campbell R. Harvey, 1995, Time-Varying World Market Integra-
tion, Journal of Finance 50, 403–444.
Bekaert, Geert, and Campbell R. Harvey, 2000, Foreign Speculators and Emerging
Equity Markets, Journal of Finance 55, 565–613.
Black, Fisher, Michael Jensen, and Myron Scholes, 1972, The Capital Asset Pricing
Model: Some Empirical Tests, in Michael Jensen, eds.: Studies in the Theory of
Capital Markets (Praeger, New York ).
Brown, Stephen J., William N Goetzmann, and Stephen A. Ross, 1995, Survival,
Journal of Finance 50, 853–873.
Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff, 1989a, A Constant Recontracting Model of
Sovereign Debt, Journal of Political Economy 97, 155–178.
Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff, 1989b, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?,
American Economic Review 79, 43–50.
Carrieri, Francesca, Vihang Errunza, and Ked Hogan, 2001, Characterizing World
Market Integration through Time, Working Paper, McGill University.
Cherian, Joseph A., and Enrico Perotti, 2001, Option Pricing and Foreign Investment
Under Political Risk, Journal of International Economics 55, 359–377.
Cochrane, John H., 1996, A Cross-Sectional Test of an Investment-Based Asset Pric-
ing Model, Journal of Political Economy 104, 572–621.
Cochrane, John H., 2001, A Rehabilitation of Stochastic Discount Factor Methodol-
ogy, NBER Working Paper No. 8533.
Conklin, James, 1998, The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain under Philip II, Jour-
nal of Political Economy 106, 483–513.
Dufﬁe, Darrell, Lasse Heje Pedersen, and Kenneth J. Singleton, 2002, Modeling
Sovereign Yield Spreads: A Case Study of Russian Debt, forthcoming in Journal
of Finance.
Eaton, Jonathan, and Mark Gersovitz, 1981, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, Review of Economic Studies 48, 289–309.
24Edwards, Sebastian, 1984, LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An Empirical
Investigation, 1976–80, American Economic Review 74, 726–734.
English, William B., 1996, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American
State Debts in the 1840’s, American Economic Review 86, 259–275.
Erb, Claude B., Campbell R. Harvey, and Tadas E. Viskanta, 1996, Political Risk,
Financial Risk and Economic Risk, Financial Analysts Journal 52, 28–46.
Errunza, Vihang, and Etienne Losq, 1985, International Asset Pricing under Mild
Segmentation: Theory and Tests, Journal of Finance 40, 105–124.
Eun, Cheol, and S. Janakiramanan, 1986, A Model of International Asset Pricing
with a Constraint on the Foreign Equity Ownership, Journal of Finance 41, 897–
914.
Fama, Eugene F., and James D. MacBeth, 1973, Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Em-
pirical Tests, Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636.
Gibson, Rajna, and Suresh M. Sundaresan, 2001, A Model of Sovereign Borrowing
and Yield Spreads, Working Paper, Columbia University.
Goetzmann, William N., and Philippe Jorion, 1999, Re-Emerging Markets, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 34, 1–32.
Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982, Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Mo-
ments Estimators, Econometrica 50, 1029–1054.
Hansen, Lars Peter, and Ravi Jagannathan, 1991, Implications of Security Market
Data for Models of Dynamic Economies, Journal of Political Economy 99, 225–262.
Hansen, Lars Peter, and Ravi Jagannathan, 1997, Assessing Speciﬁcation Errors in
Stochastic Discount Factor Models, Journal of Finance 52, 557–590.
Hansen, Lars Peter, and Scott F. Richard, 1987, The Role of Conditioning Informa-
tion in Deducing Testable Restrictions Implied by Dynamic Asset Pricing Models,
Econometrica 55, 587–613.
Harvey, Campbell R., 1995, Predictable Risk and Returns in Emerging Markets, Re-
view of Financial Studies 8, 773–816.
Hayashi, Fumio, 2000, Econometrics. (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
Heckman, James J., 1976, The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation,
Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimators for
Such Models, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5, 475–492.
25Heckman, James J., 1979, Sample Selection Bias as a Speciﬁcation Error, Econometrica
47, 153–161.
Henry, Peter Blair, 2000, Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerg-
ing Market Equity Prices, Journal of Finance 55, 529–564.
Jagannathan, Ravi, and Zhenyu Wang, 1996, The Conditional CAPM and the Cross-
Section of Expected Returns, Journal of Finance 51, 3–54.
Jagannathan, Ravi, and Zhenyu Wang, 2002, Empirical Evaluation of Asset Pricing
Models: A Comparison of the SDF and Beta Methods, forthcoming in Journal of
Finance.
Karolyi, G. Andrew, and Ren´ e M. Stulz, 2002, Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or
Globally?, Working Paper, Ohio State University.
Kim, E. Han, and Vijay Singal, 2000, Stock Market Openings: Experience of Emerg-
ing Economies, Journal of Business 73, 25–66.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,
1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113–1155.
Newey, Whitney K., and Kenneth D. West, 1987, A Simple Positive Semi-Deﬁnite
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix, Economet-
rica 55, 703–708.
Stambaugh, Robert F., 1997, Analyzing Investments Whose Histories Differ in
Length, Journal of Financial Economics 45, 285–331.







Panel A. Developed Markets
Australia 1.07 6.84 0.52 84-01 203
Austria 1.16 7.33 0.34 84-01 203
Belgium 1.60 5.55 0.64 84-01 203
Canada 0.99 5.13 0.70 84-01 203
Denmark 1.18 5.66 0.53 84-01 203
Finland 1.91 8.62 0.54 88-01 156
France 1.59 6.07 0.70 84-01 203
Germany 1.38 6.27 0.60 84-01 203
Hong Kong 1.84 8.76 0.53 84-01 203
Ireland 1.03 5.73 0.65 88-01 156
Italy 1.46 7.51 0.51 84-01 203
Japan 1.02 7.36 0.76 84-01 203
Netherlands 1.56 4.73 0.75 84-01 203
New Zealand 0.30 7.02 0.47 88-01 156
Norway 1.09 7.26 0.58 84-01 203
Singapore 0.85 8.05 0.54 84-01 203
Spain 1.81 7.03 0.66 84-01 203
Sweden 1.65 6.92 0.63 84-01 203
Switzerland 1.51 5.38 0.66 84-01 203
U.K. 1.33 5.41 0.76 84-01 203
U.S. 1.38 4.37 0.79 84-01 203
Average 1.32 6.52 0.61
Panel B. Emerging Markets
Argentina 3.89 23.46 0.06 89-01 144
Brazil 3.16 19.61 0.31 89-01 144
Chile 1.83 7.73 0.24 89-01 144
China 0.26 13.41 0.27 93-01 96
Colombia 1.43 10.91 0.10 91-03 118
Greece 2.18 12.22 0.19 89-01 144
Hungary 1.61 13.15 0.47 93-01 96
India 0.36 8.68 0.13 92-12 97
Indonesia -0.08 15.13 0.41 90-10 123
Jordan 0.69 4.85 0.22 89-01 144
Korea 0.37 14.15 0.39 92-02 107
Malaysia 0.23 10.12 0.39 89-01 116
Mexico 2.04 10.18 0.42 89-01 144
Pakistan 0.99 12.56 0.08 91-04 117
Peru 0.75 9.14 0.34 93-01 96
Philippines 0.42 11.42 0.40 89-01 144
Poland 3.24 17.91 0.37 93-01 96
Portugal 0.96 6.91 0.51 89-01 144
South Africa 0.98 8.34 0.53 93-01 96
Sri Lanka -0.22 10.07 0.31 93-01 96
Taiwan 0.72 10.50 0.37 91-02 119
Thailand 0.38 12.55 0.43 89-01 144
Turkey 2.48 19.39 0.16 89-09 136
Venezuela 3.00 17.43 0.02 90-02 131
Zimbabwe 1.80 12.81 0.21 93-07 90
Average 1.34 12.50 0.29
Panel C. World
World 1.21 4.24 1.00 84-01 203
This table presents summary statistics of monthly dollar returns in global equity markets from
inclusion date to November 2000. Panels A, B and C show statistics for developed markets,
emerging markets and the World, respectively. The labels Average in Panels A and B refer to the
average (equally-weighted) across developed and emerging markets, respectively. The means
and standard deviations are expressed in % per month. Correlation with World refers to the
correlation coefﬁcient with the world market portfolio. The inclusion date (year-month) is the
ﬁrst month with observations of investable returns. The last observation of Malaysia is August









Panel A. Developed Markets
Australia 14,445 34.43 82.3 75.8 0.84
Austria 12,695 79.18 91.1 80.3 0.57
Belgium 13,232 144.96 87.6 78.6 0.83
Canada 17,173 51.24 89.2 78.5 0.85
Denmark 13,909 65.26 86.4 79.2 0.71
Finland 14,059 47.67 84.5 76.3 1.16
France 13,904 45.16 86.3 77.4 1.00
Germany 14,628 58.03 93.0 81.9 0.88
Hong Kong 14,849 262.96 83.7 78.4 1.11
Ireland 9,274 114.60 85.3 80.5 0.93
Italy 12,488 41.46 84.9 76.0 0.90
Japan 14,331 20.92 96.1 84.4 1.32
Netherlands 13,029 103.72 90.2 83.8 0.84
New Zealand 11,513 55.34 84.3 75.4 0.82
Norway 14,902 81.11 92.6 86.5 0.99
Singapore 11,710 373.26 89.2 83.9 1.03
Spain 9,583 37.52 81.2 75.1 1.08
Sweden 14,762 59.46 85.8 78.1 1.04
Switzerland 16,505 72.73 98.0 85.5 0.84
U.K. 13,217 51.48 90.7 73.2 0.97
U.S. 18,054 21.50 92.3 76.7 0.82
Average 13,727 86.76 88.3 79.3 0.93
Panel B. Emerging Markets
Argentina 4,706 15.18 63.4 60.6 0.31
Brazil 4,042 12.66 65.7 57.0 1.46
Chile 4,338 65.46 81.0 73.7 0.46
China 1,324 25.42 82.1 74.7 0.97
Colombia 3,300 35.38 75.0 67.4 0.31
Greece 6,768 54.16 68.9 68.5 0.54
Hungary 5,357 60.67 76.4 66.0 1.66
India 1,264 18.76 73.8 67.4 0.31
Indonesia 1,974 52.61 75.2 66.7 1.67
Jordan 2,919 144.21 64.0 71.4 0.26
Korea 6,673 62.48 85.9 78.8 1.52
Malaysia 5,124 154.20 83.5 81.1 1.04
Mexico 5,827 32.72 74.4 63.1 1.04
Pakistan 1,394 35.01 60.6 62.0 0.28
Peru 2,188 26.80 68.5 65.4 0.84
Philippines 1,763 61.48 64.0 66.7 1.12
Poland 3,820 45.84 77.8 72.1 1.80
Portugal 7,478 75.20 82.2 79.2 0.87
South Africa 3,248 47.22 75.3 71.2 1.18
Sri Lanka 2,096 67.37 69.2 68.1 0.86
Taiwan 8,063 89.88 92.6 86.5 1.03
Thailand 3,580 75.83 81.1 75.3 1.32
Turkey 3,741 41.99 60.3 55.4 0.73
Venezuela 6,055 59.64 72.6 64.5 0.07
Zimbabwe 1,182 59.00 55.7 56.0 0.74
Average 3,929 56.77 73.2 68.8 0.90
This table lists country attributes. Panels A and B show the attributes for developed markets and
emerging markets, respectively. The labels Average in Panels A and B refer to the average (equally-
weighted)acrossdevelopedandemergingmarkets, respectively. RealGDPpercapitareferstoReal
GDP per capita in constant dollars (expressed in international prices, base 1985). Trading Activity
refers to exports plus imports over nominal GDP. Real GDP per capita and trading activity are
taken from the Penn World Table for the year of 1990. Economic and Financial Ratings refer to
the average ﬁnancial and economic country rating provided by International Country Risk Guide
from inclusion date to November 2000. Beta refers to the slope-coefﬁcient in a regression on a
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A: World CAPM with Constant Betas
Volatility Attribute
Developed Markets 0.79 0.45 0.07 0.27
Emerging Markets 0.89 0.44 0.50 -0.05
Financial Rating Attribute
Developed Markets 0.79 0.50 0.00 0.29
Emerging Markets 0.89 0.48 0.50 -0.09
Trading Activity Attribute
Developed Markets 0.79 0.50 -0.05 0.33
Emerging Markets 0.89 0.51 0.49 -0.09
Panel B: World CAPM with Time-Varying Betas
Volatility Attribute
Developed Markets 0.79 0.46 0.06 0.28
Emerging Markets 0.89 0.33 0.58 -0.01
Financial Rating Attribute
Developed Markets 0.79 0.50 0.01 0.28
Emerging Markets 0.89 0.36 0.59 -0.07
Trading Activity Attribute
Developed Markets 0.79 0.50 -0.05 0.34
Emerging Markets 0.89 0.37 0.58 -0.06
This table presents the decomposition of the measured excess returns for
developed and emerging markets (equally-weighted averages) generated by
models with sample selectivity. Panel A and B show the decomposition for the
world CAPM with constant and time-varying betas, respectively, as in Table
3. The speciﬁcation with the volatility attribute is as reported in Table 3 (with
no constant term). The speciﬁcations with ﬁnancial rating and trading activ-
ity use these attributes instead of the volatility attribute. The decompositions
are expressed in % per month. Average refers to the the average excess return
from inclusion date. Systematic risk refers to the contribution of market com-
ponents. Sample selectivity refers to contribution due to sample selectivity.
Pricing error refers to the average pricing error.



















-1.76 -1.46 -2.15 0.01 0.14 0.87 [0.00]
(0.26) (1.73) (1.32) (0.05) (0.02)
Panel B: Volatility Projections







12.10 -20.35 6.20 -0.59 0.19 [0.01]
(1.90) (18.65) (16.24) (0.87)
This table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions for 25 emerging markets. Het-
eroscedasticity consistent standard errors for the estimated coefﬁcients are reported in parenthe-
ses. Panel A and B show the results for sample selectivity and volatility, respectively, on various
country attributes. Sample selectivity is measured as the part of the measured equity premium
due to sample selectivity as obtained in the world CAPM with time-varying betas using relative
economic rating, and volatility × relative economic rating as in Table 3 (with no constant term).
The attributes are the economic rating, the ﬁnancial rating, and the relative trading activity. All
attributes are relative the U.S. The Adjusted R-square reports the adjusted coefﬁcient of determi-
nation. Test of joint signiﬁcance reports p-values (within square brackets) from a test of jointly
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
31Figure 1: Sovereign Bond Spreads and Country Ratings
Figure 1 shows monthly observations of sovereign spreads (expressed in % per year) versus compos-
ite country ratings for nine emerging markets with Brady bonds. The cross-sectional averages of the
variables for each month have been subtracted.
32Figure 2: World CAPM with Constant Betas
This ﬁgure shows average realized excess returns versus predicted excess returns (in % per month)
on 46 national market portfolios. The predicted returns represented by crosses (developed markets)
and circles (emerging markets) are the ﬁtted values from the estimation of the world CAPM with
constant betas and no sample selectivity in Panel A, Table 3. The straight line is a 45-degree line
through the origin. The sample period is January 1984 (or inclusion date) to November 2000.
33Figure 3: World CAPM with Time-Varying Betas and Sample Selectivity
This ﬁgure shows average realized excess returns versus predicted excess returns (in % per month)
on 46 national market portfolios. The predicted returns represented by crosses (developed markets)
and circles (emerging markets) are the ﬁtted values from the estimation of the world CAPM with
time-varying betas and sample selectivity in Panel B, Table 3. The straight line is a 45-degree line
through the origin. The sample period is January 1984 (or inclusion date) to November 2000.
34